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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
     "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."  
This absolute-free-speech sentiment, first reportedly expressed by Voltaire (1770), has 
long been held as a democratic ideal of paramount importance (Jefferson, 1944; Prothro 
& Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Mill, 1869). In reality, most Americans are not willing 
to fight and die for unpopular speech; indeed they will not even tacitly allow 
controversial public displays and protests (Stouffer, 1955). This disparity between ideal 
and fact was first observed in a landmark political tolerance study by political scientist 
Samuel Stouffer, and has vexed political theorists and scientists ever since. 
    In survey and experimental studies, political tolerance is typically defined as "an 
individual's willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes" (Crick, 
1973; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982). Across decades of inquiry and using a variety 
of dependent measures, political scientists and psychologists have replicated Stouffer's 
basic finding: the American public is massively intolerant (McClosky & Brill, 
1983;Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sullivan et al, 1982;  Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The 
psychological underpinnings of tolerance (or rather, mass intolerance) thus deserve 
scientific inquiry. 
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Psychological Contributors to Tolerance 
Survey and experimental research has outlined a bevy of psychological factors 
that influence how readily a person tolerates groups they find abhorrent. Among 
personality factors, low self-esteem, high neuroticism and low openness to experience 
have all been linked to low political tolerance (Marcus et al, 1995, Sullivan et al, 1982). 
Other individual differences such as authoritarianism have also been linked to tolerance, 
with more authoritarian and right-wing authoritarian participants displaying far less 
tolerance than average (Gibson, 1987). A variety of situational threat manipulations have 
also demonstrably lowered individuals' political tolerance (Chanley, 1994; Theiss-Morse, 
1993). 
Elite Tolerance 
     Social and political differences also appear to influence political tolerance. 
However, some of the more obvious possible determinants of tolerance do not, in fact, 
appear to be directly implicated: while social conservatism appears to have a bearing on 
tolerance, political ideology and party do not have direct effects (Sullivan, Marcus, 
Feldman & Piereson, 1981; see Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1993 for a review). One of 
the most robust findings in the political tolerance literature is that political elites and 
activists are more tolerant than members of the mass public (McClosky, 1964; McClosky 
& Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955). Samuel 
Stouffer hypothesized that people who were involved in politics were better informed 
about society's core democratic values than average, and were more motivated to uphold 
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them. As a result, such elites were capable of pausing and taking a "sober second 
thought" when faced with an objectionable group; he argued that this thoughtful pause 
afforded elites greater tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). With this argument Stouffer essentially 
suggested that tolerance judgments were psychologically similar to other forms of bias 
correction (Devine, 1989; Wegener & Petty, 2001; Lepore & Brown, 2002). 
     One possible reason that elites and activists are more tolerant is that they tend to 
be better-educated (Sullivan et al, 1982). Controlling for political involvement, more 
years of education typically spell greater tolerance (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sinderman, 
1984). Noting this pattern in his data, Stouffer hypothesized the mediating role of 
diversity of experience: the educated have more exposure to a variety of individuals, he 
argued, and through this exposure learn how to peacefully coexist with different others. 
This explanation for elite tolerance has generally not held over time, however (Sullivan et 
al, 1982; Bobo & Licari, 1989). The nature of the link between political involvement, 
education, and political tolerance thus remains unclear. 
The Role of Cognitive Complexity 
    Bobo and Licari (1989) suggested that both political elites and the highly 
educated are more tolerant because they are more cognitively complex. The authors‟ 
logic is similar to that expressed in Stouffer's notion of a "sober second thought"; the 
educated and politically informed possess the capacity to think rationally and carefully 
when forming political tolerance judgments, while others do not. Bobo and Licari found a 
link between cognitive complexity and tolerance, and concluded that elites and the highly 
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educated are more tolerant by virtue of a "sober second thought". However, their study 
was mired with methodological problems. The authors' only measure of "cognitive 
complexity" was a vocabulary test, and participants‟ level of education was left 
unmeasured. In using this methodology the authors neglected the possibility that 
vocabulary-test score simply was associated with some other variable left unmeasured 
(such as education). Bobo and Licari have therefore provided limited evidence for the 
"sober second thought" of tolerance, at best. There is little substantial evidence that 
increases in cognitive ability or complexity engendered by education or elite status cause 
a concomitant increase in tolerance. 
    Indeed, other studies fly in the face of the "elites take a sober second thought" 
hypothesis regarding political tolerance. One major problem with in this mediational 
argument is that elites and activists are not necessarily more cognitively complex. 
Political ideologues have been observed to score low on several measures of cognitive 
depth-of-processing, such as integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1983, 1984). Using a 
variety of measures, Van Hiel & Mervielde (2003) found that ideological extremists (who 
are more likely to be activists, and are more likely to be politically involved) 
demonstrated lower cognitive complexity on most tests. This body of research suggests 
that elites and activists may not arrive at more tolerant decisions as a result of the depth- 
or breadth-of-cognitive-processing. 
Tolerance as "Knee-jerk"? 
     The results of several additional studies suggest that political tolerance may not 
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arise from the "sober second thoughts" of pensive, cognitively deep elites. As described 
above, elites may not be more cognitively "deep" or more especially capable of "second 
thinking" in the first place. Additionally, political tolerance itself may not be a judgment 
that is reached with slow deliberation. Kuklinksi and colleagues (1991, 1993) 
manipulated participants' processing goal before providing them with a political tolerance 
questionnaire. Participants were told to either complete the tolerance questionnaire while 
thinking deliberately and slowly about possible consequences of their decisions, or they 
were instructed to fill out the questionnaire intuitively- according to their "gut feelings".  
     The "sober second thought" school of political tolerance would predict that 
participants in the "consequences" condition would report greater tolerance than those 
who ran through the questionnaire quickly. Kuklinski et al found the opposite result: 
participants who had to think about the consequences of tolerance reported less tolerance 
for controversial groups than participants who used their gut-level reactions. If tolerance 
involves a process similar to prejudice correction, then perhaps tolerance itself is the 
snap-judgment that is "corrected" given time. Tolerance may not be a second thought, but 
rather a knee-jerk response evident only in the elite and educated.  
     Further in support for the tolerance-as-knee-jerk  research hypothesis is the 
observation that internalization of democratic norms predicts tolerance (Gibson & 
Bingham, 1983; Gibson, 1987; Lawrence, 1976; McClosky & Brill, 1983). This suggests 
that those who are committed to democratic ideals may voice attitudes of tolerance 
without much thought, because valued concepts such as free speech are central to their 
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understanding of American government. When democratic values are deeply internalized 
(as in political elites), tolerance may be expressed as an automatic attitude, one that is 
readily accessible at the mere mention of attitude-relevant issues such as civil liberties 
(Fazio, 2001).  
Considering the possibility that tolerant judgments may be reached 
„automatically‟ without extensive cognitive processing, it pays also to consider the role of 
attitude importance and attitude accessibility (e.g., Krosnick, 1989; Fazio, 2001)..  
Attitudes of high personal relevance or importance are typically easier to access, and are 
more likely to be automatically activated even in the absence of effortful processing.   
Elites and activists generally have high commitment to democratic norms, and may 
therefore appear more tolerant than non-elites because their attitudes toward civil liberties 
are more accessible than their attitudes toward disliked groups, or their attitudes toward 
the possible negative outcomes of tolerance (Marcus et al, 1995; Sullivan et al, 1982). A 
strong, important pro-free-speech attitude may result in a cognitive “knee-jerk” 
expression of high political tolerance.  
Testing the “Sober Second Thought” and “Knee-jerk” Views of Tolerance 
    The present study attempts to glean whether political tolerance is generally 
attained through a slow, cognitively deep "sober second thought" or whether it is driven 
by a relatively thoughtless "knee-jerk" automatic attitude. Previous studies have 
examined the cognitive determinants and nature of tolerance by measuring variables such 
as cognitive complexity. Because cognitive complexity has typically been measured 
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rather than manipulated, it has been conflated with a variety of other variables in these 
past studies (e.g., education).  
Rather than measuring cognitive complexity using survey methodology, the 
present study experimentally manipulated how effortfully and deeply participants 
considered questions of political tolerance. Participants in one condition were instructed 
from the experiment's outset in a manner intended to make them feel “accountable” for 
their tolerance judgments. This should boost their depth-of-cognitive processing, or at 
least motivate them to engage in bias-correction (a detailed discussion of this 
manipulation and its possible effects is found in the “methods” section below). The 
second group of participants were assigned to either a 'distraction' condition, and asked to 
complete a side task designed to prevent deep, thoughtful processing. The third group of 
participants was assigned to a control condition where no additional tasks or instructions 
were added. This manipulation is similar to the tolerance experiments by Kuklinski et al, 
insofar as participants are randomly assigned to one of three possible instruction 
manipulation conditions, one of which suggests conscious deliberation, one of which 
discourages such thoughtful processing, and one control. The presently employed 
manipulation is distinct, however, in that the 'high accountability' condition, in contrast to 
Kuklinski and colleague's “think about the consequences” condition, encourages 
participants to think more without instructing them in what they should think about.  
Participants in Kuklinski et al's 'consequences' condition may have only devoted 
more thought to the negative ramifications of tolerance, because 'consequences' may have 
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a more negative connotation (a possible confound Kuklinski and colleagues themselves 
foresaw). This focus on the potential drawbacks of tolerance, such as threats to public 
safety, the potential for ensuing chaos, etc, may explain why participants were generally 
less tolerant when asked to think 'more'. Rather than giving participants in the 
'accountability' condition specific issues to consider as they ponder political tolerance, 
participants in the present study were only instructed that they would be held responsible 
for their tolerance judgments, which leaves the issues and values they may in turn 
consider in forming their tolerance judgments entirely open-ended. 
The manipulation of participants‟ accountability alters their motivation to process 
tolerance questions deeply. By manipulating accountability and by preventing deep-
thinking through the use of a distraction condition; it can be determined how cognitive 
effort actually impacts tolerance and do so while controlling for related constructs such as 
education. By using a subject pool that is relatively homogenous in age and educational 
background, years of education can be held nearly constant and therefore limit its 
potential as a confounding variable.  
    This study also has the advantage of potentially pitting the tolerance-as-sober-
second-thought hypothesis against the tolerance-as-knee-jerk hypothesis. If tolerant 
people arrive at their judgments through slow, deliberate cognitive effort, then 
participants in conditions amenable to effortful processing should express more tolerance. 
If tolerance is instead a thoughtless, automatic knee-jerk attitude, participants in the 
distraction condition should appear more tolerant than those given time and sufficient 
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motivation to deliberate. Several possible moderators of these two effects will also be 
explored. 
Potential moderators 
The effect of instruction manipulations on political tolerance may depend on 
several individual differences among participants. These include constructs related to 
political awareness such as ideological extremity, party identification, political expertise, 
political interest and political involvement..  Since political tolerance is quite rare in the 
mass public, tolerance might only be an automatic knee-jerk among those who are 
informed, involved in politics, or who have internalized democratic norms (i.e., for those 
whom pro-free-speech attitudes are highly important and accessible). The extent and 
breadth of mass intolerance precludes the possibility that tolerance is an immediate, no-
brainer decision for the majority of voters. However, for participants who are closer to 
being political "elites" (e.g. those high on political involvement, expertise, political 
interest, etc) internalization of democratic norms and a strong commitment to the 
American political system and its values may promote an automatic attitude of tolerance. 
Conversely, these high-awareness, high-involvement participants may display less 
tolerance than usual when the experiment instructions place them in a position of 
accountability. While these participants would normally be more inclined to 
automatically express tolerance, accountability instructions might motivate the 
individuals to consider additional, conflicting considerations.  For example, just as 
participants in Kuklinski et al's (1991) study became less tolerant in the “think about the 
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consequences” condition, the elite participants in the present study may be more prone to 
anticipate the (negative) consequences of tolerance when placed in the high 
accountability condition.  
Alternatively, elite participants may correct their automatic, tolerant attitude when 
they are held accountable not because of consideration of consequences, but as a form of 
bias correction (Wegner & Petty, 1995). If participants in the 'accountability' condition 
are simply motivated to 'correct' and give defensible answers, then elites may express 
(typically) high or greater-than-usual tolerance. Elites are more likely not only to have 
internalized democratic norms; they are also more likely to know that widespread civil 
liberties are the politically 'correct' response in the first place. Therefore the 
accountability manipulation may have entirely disparate effects on elite tolerance, 
depending on whether accountability inspires thoughtful consideration of consequences 
or attitude correction.  
    A different pattern may arise amongst participants low in political interest, 
involvement, and other related constructs. Participants who score low on such variables- 
often labeled political 'novices'- should not be especially tolerant by default, and should 
report rather low tolerance scores in the control and "distraction" conditions. In the 
"accountable" condition, however, novice participants may take the time to correct for 
their prejudices and may express slightly more tolerance than usual. As with political 
elites, non-elite participants may shift their views either by an effortful consideration of 
the values involved in their decision, or may just engage more swiftly in bias-correction 
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based on naïve theories of their own prejudice.  Again the exact pattern of effects of the 
'accountability' manipulation among novices may depend on whether participants correct 
for bias or think more deeply in general. If novices use the accountability manipulation as 
a cue to think more deliberately about the political issues implicated in political tolerance, 
they may become more tolerant overall. If being held accountable only alters novice's 
motivation to correct for bias, they may 'correct' for what prejudice they possess toward 
abhorrent groups, and consequently voice greater tolerance. Alternatively, non-elite 
participants may take the “accountability” manipulation as a cue to think about the 
negative consequences of free speech, and may subsequently respond with typically low 
or lower-than-average tolerance.  
 Political ideology and party identification might also influence political tolerance; 
Namely, conservative and Republican participants might likely report less tolerance. 
Diminished tolerance among the political right has frequently been observed in past 
studies (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al, 1981) and I expect it to be replicated here.  The 
reasons for this demonstrable trend are uncertain, as the relation between political 
ideology or party identification and cognitive style and motivation to correct bias is 
inconsistent in past research (Tetlock, 1983; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson & 
Chamberlin, 2002). Conservative and Republican participants may be less tolerant due to 
placing greater value on public safety and the maintenance of law and order rather than 
on civil liberties, or they may report less tolerance because they are high on average on 
personality traits related to low tolerance, such as authoritarianism. Conservative 
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participants may be less tolerant due to a smaller breadth of experience, and subsequent 
unfamiliarity with strange and frightening political groups, as proposed by Stouffer.  
Potential Controls 
 Considering that differing levels of tolerance may be driven in part by differences 
in motivation or ability to process tolerance questions effortfully, the impact of several 
individual difference variables in cognitive motivation and style-of-processing must also 
be considered and controlled for. Participants‟ need for cognition will be measured 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and need to evaluate (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).  
If a tendency to process slowly and thoughtfully leads to tolerance- ala a “sober second 
thought”, then participants high in need for cognition may be more disposed to tolerance, 
regardless of experimental condition. If tolerance is instead an automatic attitude, then 
the opposite effect might be observed.  
Hypotheses 
There are seven hypotheses pertaining to this study, listed below.  
H1a:  Previous research suggests elites are more tolerant than novices.  
Hypothesis 1a presumes that this difference arises even for automatic, “knee jerk” 
tolerance judgments.  Thus, in the distraction condition, Hypothesis 1a predicts experts 
will express more tolerance than novices. 
H1b: Hypothesis 1b presumes the difference between experts and novices 
primarily occurs as a result of non-automatic, cognitive deliberation.  According to this 
view, in the distraction condition, expert and novice will express similar levels of 
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tolerance. 
H2: In the accountability condition, participants may report higher tolerance 
overall than in the distraction condition. Non-distracted participants who are not 
distracted and are held accountable for their judgments may engage in corrective 
elaboration, and adjust from their initially prejudiced attitude to a more tolerant one. 
H3: In the accountability condition, participants may instead be more motivated to 
consider the consequences of tolerance (as opposed to engaging in correction for 
prejudice, as expressed in hypothesis 2). If this is the case, participants may report less 
tolerance in the accountability condition than in the distraction condition, across both 
elites and novices.  
H4: In contrast with Hypotheses 2 and 3, accountability may encourage different 
kinds of elaboration among elites than novices. Insofar as previous research suggests 
elites are more tolerant than novices, accountability may encourage elite participants to 
consider democratic norms and the value of civil liberties, or to consider the import of 
correcting for anti-group biases, while novice participants may consider the potential 
dangers of free speech, or their innate prejudice for their least-liked group. In other 
words, participants may engage in “flexible deliberation”.  If this hypothesis holds, elites 
should become more tolerant in the accountability condition versus the distraction 
condition, while novices will become more intolerant.  This hypothesis argues that 
accountability engenders cognitive elaboration that reinforces an individual‟s initial 
“leaning” with regard to tolerance judgments. As such, accountability magnifies the 
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difference between elite and novice participants (who presumably possess distinct initial 
„leanings‟).  
H5: Accountability may instead encourage the opposite type of “flexible 
deliberation”- elites and novices may both be motivated to consider factors that do not 
normally influence their decisions, specifically because they will have to justify their 
judgment to another person. Therefore, elite participants may focus on the possible 
negative consequences of tolerance, and may become less tolerant overall. Conversely, 
novices may be motivated to correct for their prejudices or consider the value of civil 
liberties, and report greater tolerance than in the distraction condition.  
H6: Given no special instructions, participants in the control condition may 
possess insufficient motivation to correct for bias, and thus may display the same degree 
of intolerance as the participants in the distraction condition.  
H7:  In contrast to Hypothesis 6, participants in the control condition may instead 
behave more like participants in the accountability condition; In other words, participants 
in the distraction condition may be under too heavy a cognitive load to report anything 
beyond an automatic attitude, whereas participants in the accountability and control 
conditions may possess sufficient cognitive resources to deliberate in one of the four 
ways proposed above (in Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5). 
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                                             CHAPTER TWO 
METHODS AND MATERIALS 
Participants and Sampling 
     For the present study I utilized a convenience sample of undergraduate 
psychology students. Students enrolled in an introductory psychology course could 
volunteer to participate in the study in return for one credit toward their course's research 
participation requirement. This sampling method had the advantage of affording a large 
potential sample size at relatively no cost. The subject pool is typically homogenous in 
terms of age and years of education, which is advantageous for the purposes of this study 
as education is thereby held nearly constant. Education can thus not be conflated with 
cognitive ability or political elite status, as it has been in past studies of political tolerance 
(e.g., Bobo & Licari, 1989).  
 A total of 165 Loyola Undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology 
course were recruited to participate in the experiment. The sample consisted of 46 men 
and 119 women. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 25 years old (M=18.64).  
Procedure 
 Upon enrolling, participants were brought into a laboratory room by an 
experimenter, in groups of one to six. Participants were informed that they would be 
answering questions about “young adults‟ political opinions”. The experimenter then 
asked participants to take a seat at a computer where the survey would be administered. 
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                                                                                                                                                                                      The survey instructions would differ depending on the condition to which the participant 
was randomly assigned (accountability, distraction, or control: see below). Upon reading 
the condition-specific instructions, all participants were asked to report their “least-liked” 
political group. Participants were then asked to respond to a twenty-item tolerance survey 
(see below). After responding to the tolerance questionnaire, participants were asked to 
report their responses to various political, cognitive, and demographic items (see below).  
Materials 
Predictor Variables: Political Measures 
  Participants were asked to report their political ideology on a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal) with a midpoint of 
"moderate". Participants were asked to report their party identification on an ordinal scale 
with the following options: Strong Democrat, Moderate Democrat, Independent, 
Moderate Republican, Strong Democrat.  
  Participants' political expertise was assessed using a fifteen-item questionnaire 
asking participants open-ended knowledge questions regarding American politics and 
government (e.g., “How many seats are there the Senate?”) as well as asking them to 
identify current political figures (e.g., “Hilary Clinton) in a multiple choice format (Delli 
Carpini, & Keeter, 1993). Participants' responses were scored as dichotomous 
right/wrong answers, and then averaged to compute a total knowledge score.   
Participants were asked to report their level of political interest by responding to 
three seven-point scale items (e.g., “Generally speaking, I am interested in politics.”) 
ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). To measure political 
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                                                                                                                                                                                      involvement, participants were asked to respond to five seven-point scale items assessing 
their degree of behavioral involvement in politics (e.g., “I intend to vote in the next 
election.”; “I like to participate in political campaigns.”). Participants were asked to 
report the extent to which they pay attention  to politics using a one-item, seven-point 
scale measure (“Generally speaking, I pay attention to politics”) ranging from 1 (disagree 
strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).  
Predictor Variables: Cognitive Measures 
       Participants‟ need for cognition was assessed using a 16-item questionnaire of 
five-point scale items (e.g., “I prefer complex to simple problems”), with possible 
responses ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) (Cacioppo et al, 1996).  
Participants‟ need for evaluation was assessed using a 16-item questionnaire of five-point 
scale items (e.g., “I form opinions about everything”) ranging from 1 (extremely 
uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me) (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).  
Predictor Variables: Manipulated Independent Variable 
    Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: an 
accountability condition, a distraction condition and a control (no special instructions, no 
additional task) condition. Participants in the accountability manipulation condition were 
informed by the experiment materials that they would have to justify their survey answers 
to another person with unknown views. Past research has demonstrated that making a 
participant feel accountable for their responses in this way boosts integrative complexity, 
or the extent and depth of processing (Tetlock, 1983). 
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                                                                                                                                                                                           Participants in the high cognitive load condition were informed by the 
experimental materials that they would be asked to memorize a seven-digit string of 
numbers that would be provided before beginning their questionnaire, and which they 
would be asked to report back after completing the political tolerance portion. 
Participants were then provided with the seven-digit number and then administered the 
tolerance questionnaire. Participants in this condition received an additional manipulation 
check from the ones utilized for all participants: upon completing the tolerance 
questionnaire, participants in the “distraction” condition were asked to report the number 
they told to remember. This number was then coded as incorrect or correct (incorrect= 0, 
correct=1) by the researcher. This manipulation has been used to place participants under 
high cognitive load in past decision-making research (e.g., Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). 
         Participants in the control condition received no special instructions or 
additional tasks to perform before completing the political tolerance questionnaire. 
Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance 
     Participants' political tolerance was assessed using the content-controlled 
procedure first outlined by Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus (1982). Participants were first 
asked to name their least-liked political group. Participants were given several options of 
contemporary fringe political groups, including the Klu Klux Klan, Tea Party Protesters, 
Pro-Choice activists, Pro-Life activists, and Atheists. Participants also had the option to 
name their own least-liked group ("Other: _______"). 
    Participants were then asked to respond to a variety of questions inquiring 
about their least-liked group's right to civil liberties. Participants saw the least-liked 
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                                                                                                                                                                                      group they selected (or named) in the political tolerance response items, though the 
content of the questions was otherwise held constant. Participants were asked to evaluate 
their least-liked group's right to protest, hold rallies, and run for political office, among 
other related First Amendment rights. As originally used by Sullivan et al (1982), 
participants were asked to report their tolerance on a seven-point scale (1= disagree 
strongly; 7=agree strongly) in response to each question (e.g., “Members of the 
__________ should be banned from being President of the U.S.”). 
Manipulation Checks: Self-Report of Cognitive Effort 
     I attempted to ensure the accountability manipulation was successful in 
motivating participants to process more deliberately by asking them to report how much 
time and effort they placed into answering the political tolerance questions. Participants 
were asked to respond to five seven-point scale items inquiring into how thoughtfully and 
deliberately they believed they answered the tolerance items (e.g., "I imagined possible 
consequences of my answer when I filled out the questionnaire."; "I answered each 
question fairly slowly and thoughtfully"). If the accountability and distraction 
manipulations were successful, participants in the accountability condition should report 
exerting greater cognitive effort than participants in the distraction and control 
conditions.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
Statistical Treatment Overview 
       Except when otherwise noted, multiple regression was used to analyze the data 
for the present study.  Continuous moderating variables (e.g., political knowledge, 
ideology, political involvement, etc) were centered (by subtracting participant's scores on 
each scale from the sample mean) and categorical variables (e.g. condition, party 
affiliation, demographics) were dummy coded.  All two-way interaction terms (between, 
e.g., political expertise and condition) were created by multiplying the appropriate 
variables together.  These terms were entered into a regression equation.  By using this 
statistical approach, omnibus main effects can be tested at Step 1 and two-way 
interactions can be tested at Step 2, and so on for three-way or four-way interactions 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  
       When significant interactions were found between condition and the predicted 
political moderators, simple effects were explored via regression with dummy coding 
using the techniques outlined by Aiken and West (1991).  For example, political interest 
can be recoded such that the effect of condition can be seen when political interest is low 
(one standard deviation below mean) versus high (one standard deviation above mean) 
(e.g., the effect of condition on tolerance when low interest = 0, high interest= 1, or low 
interest= -1, high interest= 0). 
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Preliminary Analyses 
Reliability Analyses
Composite scores were created for all multi-item measures, including political tolerance, 
political expertise, effort expended, need for cognition, and political interest. Reliability 
analyses were performed to determine how best to create these composite scores. All 
twenty tolerance items were highly internally reliable upon initial analysis (α=.927), and 
so all twenty items were included in participants‟ composite political tolerance score. 
Need for cognition was also internally reliable (α=.894) and all items were retained for 
participants‟ composite score.  
 When composite scales were not sufficiently internally reliable at first analysis, 
items were selectively removed until the highest possible reliability score could be 
attained for that scale. For example, the initial five-item measure of participants‟ self-
reported effort was not sufficiently reliable (α=.503), but reliability analyses suggested 
that Chronbach‟s alpha for the scale would increase if effort item 1 was removed. Effort 
item 1 was removed and analyses were performed again; reliability analysis again 
suggested that Chronbach‟s alpha could be boosted through the removal of effort item 5. 
Item 5 was then removed from the effort scale, and reliability analyses were performed 
again- this procedure was repeated until Chronbach‟s alpha for the scale was as high as 
possible. Through this method, final composite scales of effort, expertise, and interest 
were created.  
 The final, most reliable possible effort scale consists of effort items 3 and 4 
(α=.690). The final measure of expertise contains all fifteen items except for an open-
  
22 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ended item asking which political party controlled the House of Representatives (the 
2010 midterm national elections were held during the time of data collection, and 
participants may have been confused about whether to report the pre- or post-election 
results (α=.504). The final measure of political interest contained items two of the 
original five-item measure (α=.840). 
Manipulation Check 
 To confirm that the accountability manipulation did indeed influence participants‟ 
processing of the tolerance questionnaire, I performed a univariate analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) of condition predicting effort, and an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of 
condition predicting effort with expertise, attention to politics, interest in politics, need 
for cognition and gender entered as covariates (see below for description of the use of 
these as control variables). ANOVA and ANCOVA results demonstrated no significant 
difference in participants‟ self-report level of effort between conditions, (SS= 4.329 
F(2,162)= 1.341, p= .264, η²= .016 without controls; with controls, F(2,162)= .072, p= 
.780,  η²=.019 see Tables 1 and 2 in appendix). This suggests that participants in the 
accountability, control, and distraction conditions did not differ significantly in the 
amount of effort they reported expending on the tolerance questions.  
However, since the accountability manipulation was intended to influence 
participants‟ efforts in processing the political tolerance questions while the distraction 
manipulation was intended only to influence ability to process, it was necessary to also 
examine all pairwise tests of the effect of condition rather than the omnibus test alone. 
All possible pairwise contrasts were conducted in ANOVA and ANCOVA as well, to 
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ensure that there were no significant differences between any two conditions on level 
of political tolerance, in addition to tests of omnibus differences.  Contrasts indicate that 
participants in the accountability condition (M= .150 without controls; M= .141 with 
controls) did not differ significantly in political tolerance than participants in the control 
condition (M= .049 without controls; M= .088 with controls) or participants in the 
distraction conditions (M= -.241 without controls; M= -.240 with controls, all p>.05, see 
Table 3 and 4 in appendix). Contrasts also indicated that participants in the accountability 
condition did not differ significantly from participants in the control and distraction 
conditions when the latter two groups were pooled (F(1,162)= 1.149, η²=.007, p=.285 
without controls; F(1,162)= 1.338, η²=.008, p=.249 with controls, see Table 5 in 
appendix).  
These results may indicate that the accountability and distraction manipulations 
were weak or unsuccessful.  Or these results may indicate the effort measure was 
insensitive to actual variations in participants‟ processing of the questions (e.g., a ceiling 
effect may have occurred, where all participants were motivated to report high effort for 
reasons of social desirability). The results of the manipulation check do, however, reveal 
non-significant differences in the expected direction.  Namely, participants in the 
accountability condition have a higher mean effort score than participants in the control 
condition, who had higher mean effort score than participants in the distraction condition.  
Bivariate Relations Between Variables 
 Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between condition 
and the continuous predictor variables- need for cognition, political interest, political 
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expertise, and attention paid to politics, as well as gender. Five one-way analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not participants in the three 
manipulation conditions differed significantly in their scores on these variables. ANOVA 
results indicated that there were no significant differences between participants in the 
accountability, distraction, and control conditions on these five variables (all p>.05, see 
Tables 6 and 7). Thus, random assignment to the three conditions successfully avoided 
confounds with the measured predictor variables.  
Additional preliminary analyses examined the relation between the continuous 
predictor variables (see Table 8 in appendix). Political expertise was significantly 
negatively correlated with gender (r= -.246, r²= .06, p=.002, Mmale=.0755 SD= .220, 
Mfemale=.029, SD= .172), positively correlated with political interest (r=.441, r²=.19, 
p<.001), and negatively correlated with attention paid to politics (r= -.410, r²=.17, 
p<.001). Need for cognition was significantly positively correlated with gender (r= .162, 
r²=.03, p=.038, Mmale=.095, SD=.385, Mfemale=.037, SD=.357), and attention paid to 
politics (r=.411, r²=.17, p<.001), and negatively correlated with effort (r= -.374, r²=.14, 
p<.001), and interest in politics (r= -.462, r²=.213, p<.001). Political interest was 
significantly negatively correlated with gender (r= -.252, r²=.06, p=.001, Mmale=.2795, 
SD= .775 for men, Mfemale=.108, SD=.628) and attention paid to politics (r= -.805, r²=.65, 
p<.001), and positively correlated with effort (r=.171, r²=.03, p=.028),.  Attention paid to 
politics was also significantly positively correlated with gender (r=.243, r²=.06, p=.002, 
Mmale=.146, SD=.393, Mfemale=.029, SD=.172).  
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 The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were 
also examined (see Table 8). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated 
with political expertise (r= .212, r²=.04, p=.006). Tolerance was negatively correlated 
with gender (r= -.166, r²=.02, p=.033, M=3.809, SD=1.364 for men, M=3.356, SD=1.148 
for women), need for cognition (r= -.340, r²= .11, p<.001),  and attention paid to politics 
(r= -.344, r²= .12, p<.001), and positively correlated with political interest (r= .367, r²= 
.13, p<.001),. Note that political ideology and political party, despite being variables of 
massive import in political psychology, were only correlated with one another (r=.780, 
r²=. 608 p<.001) and were not significantly related to any other measured predictors. This 
is consistent with past research demonstrating no direct link between political ideology 
and political tolerance (Sullivan et al, 1981).  
Because political expertise, attention to politics, gender, interest in politics, and 
need for cognition were significantly correlated with the dependent variable, analyses 
examining the main effect of condition on political tolerance were run twice: once with 
these variables entered as controls (in regression) or covariates (in ANCOVA), and once 
without these variables included. Inclusion of these control (covariate) variables in 
analyses presumably reduces error variance in the dependent variable.  
Main Analyses 
Three sets of analyses were performed.  First, a model focusing on the direct effect 
of Condition on political tolerance judgments was tested.  Second, models examining 
two-way interactions between a given moderator and condition were tested.  Lastly, 
models involving three-way interactions (two moderators and condition) were tested.  
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Condition Predicting Tolerance 
 A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of 
condition on tolerance. The predicted omnibus effect of condition on participants‟ 
political tolerance was not significant (F(2,162)= .742, p=.478, η²= .009p , see Table 9). 
This analysis was also performed with political interest, expertise, attention to politics, 
gender, and need for cognition entered as covariates (ANCOVA):  Again, no significant 
main effect of condition on tolerance was apparent (F(2,162)= 1.092, p=.338, η²= .014p, 
see Table 10). These results suggest that participants in the accountability, distraction, 
and control conditions did not differ significantly on political tolerance.  
 In addition to the omnibus ANOVA and ANCOVA, pairwise contrasts were also 
performed to determine whether participants in the accountability, distraction, or control 
conditions differed from one another on levels of political tolerance. Analyses revealed 
that participants in the control condition (M= 3.645 without controls, M= 3.627 with 
controls) did not differ significantly from participants in the accountability (M= 3.420 
without controls, M= 3.470 with controls) or distraction conditions (M= 3.378 without 
controls, M= 3.301 with controls), nor did participants in the accountability condition 
differ from participants in the distraction condition (all p>.15, see Tables 11, 12 and 13 in 
appendix).  
Two-Way Interaction Models (Moderator by Condition) 
 Additional analyses tested for possible interactions between condition and the 
continuous moderator variables (effort, interest, attention, and need for cognition). To test 
possible interactions between condition and these variables, I employed linear regression 
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with interaction terms. Control variables (effort, interest, attention, need for cognition, 
and gender) were entered into the regression equation along with condition and the 
potential moderator variable at step 1. The condition by moderator variable (effort, 
interest, attention, or need for cognition) interaction terms were entered as additional 
predictors at step 2. Main effects of condition and the moderator were tested at step 1, 
while interactions between conditions and continuous predictors were tested at step 2.  
 Linear transformations were performed on the control and independent variables 
before running the analyses. Control variables were normalized. All continuous 
moderator variables were re-scaled from -.5 (low on expertise, attention, need for 
cognition, or interest, respectively) to .5 (high on these continuous variables, 
respectively).  Two two-way interactions were found to be significant at the p<.05 level: 
condition by need for cognition, and condition by gender.  
Condition by Need for Cognition Interaction 
 The two condition dummy codes (accountability versus control and distraction 
versus control) were entered along with need for cognition and the control variables at 
step 1. Linear regression results at step 1 revealed no significant effect of condition on 
tolerance for the accountability versus control dummy code (B= -.156, β= .062 SE= .213 
with controls, B= -.271, β= -.107, SE= .215 without controls, both p>.10), nor for the 
distraction versus control dummy code (B= -.331, β= -.124, SE= .224 with controls, B= -
.344, β= -.129, SE= .227, both p>.10, see Tables 14 and 15). This lack of an effect of 
condition is consistent with the ANOVA results reported above. Step 1 did reveal a 
significant main effect of need for cognition predicting tolerance, (B= -.745, β= -.225, 
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SE= .272, without controls, B= - 1.156, β= -.348, SE= .245 with controls, both p<.05), 
suggesting that participants higher in need for cognition reported lower tolerance.  
Regression analyses did reveal a marginally significant interaction between the 
accountability condition dummy code and need for cognition predicting political 
tolerance at step 2 with controls (B= .972, β= .147, SE= .582, t(154)= 1.670, p= .097, see 
Table 14), though this interaction was not significant in an otherwise-identical regression 
performed without controls (B= .754, β= .114, SE= .585 p>.10). The significant 
interaction term suggests that the effect of the accountability condition (versus control) 
on participants‟ political tolerance may be moderated by participants‟ need for cognition.  
 Simple slopes analyses revealed a marginally significant difference between 
participants high in need for cognition in the accountability condition (M= 3.013 SE= 
.202) who were marginally less tolerant than high need for cognition participants in the 
control condition (M= 3.172 SE= .212; B= .972, β= .243, SE= .582, p<.05, see Tables 16 
and 17).  Participants high in need for cognition in the control condition (M= 3.172 SE= 
.212) did not differ from high need for cognition participants in the distraction condition 
(M= 3.231 SE= .191,; B= -.454, β= -.110, SE= .596, p= .447). Participants high in need 
for cognition in the accountability condition (M= 3.013 SE= .202) did not significantly 
differ from participants high in need for cognition in the distraction condition (M= 3.231 
SE= .191; B= -.518, β= -.126, SE= .597, p= .387).    Conversely, participants low in need 
for cognition were more tolerant in the accountability condition (M= 4.004 SE= .204) 
than in the control condition (M= 3.678 SE= .192; B= .972, β= .242, SE= .582, p<.10) . 
However, participants low in need for cognition in the accountability condition (M= 
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4.004 SE= .204)  did not differ significantly in tolerance from participants in the 
distraction condition (M= 3.964 SE= .193; B= -.518, β= -.123, SE= .597, p= .387).  There 
was no significant difference between participants low in need for cognition in the 
control (M= 3.678 SE= .192) and distraction conditions (M= 3.964 SE= .193;B= -.454, β= 
.129, SE= .596, p= .447).   
 These results are somewhat consistent with hypothesis 5, which anticipated that 
individuals who are more apt to think effortfully about politics would engage in “flexible 
deliberation” of the sort that would decrease tolerance in the accountability condition 
(either due to consideration of factors they don‟t normally weigh, or due to a desire to 
give a response that would be similar to their conversation partners‟). Hypothesis 5 also 
predicted that those less apt to think effortfully about politics would show “flexible 
deliberation” of the sort that would increase tolerance in the accountability condition 
(either due to consideration of pro-tolerance factors such participants don‟t normally take 
into account, or due to a desire to give a socially desirable response).   
Although this analysis garnered some support for Hypothesis 5, related analyses 
failed to reveal that political expertise, interest, attention to politics, or any other predictor 
related to “elite political status” was a significant moderator of the effect of condition on 
tolerance. Instead, the effect of condition on tolerance was moderated by need for 
cognition, a more general cognitive individual-difference variable.  
Condition by Gender Interaction 
 Regression analyses also revealed a significant interaction of the distraction 
condition dummy code with gender, which was apparent in analyses both with and 
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without controls (B= -1.080, β= -.220, SE= .505, t(154)= -2.137 with controls, B= -
1.186,  β= -.214 SE= .538, both p<.05, see Tables 18 and 19). This suggests that the 
effect of the distraction condition (versus control) on participants‟ political tolerance was 
moderated by participants‟ gender.  
Simple slopes analyses revealed that female participants are significantly more 
tolerant in the distraction condition (M= 3.571 SE= .128) than in the control condition 
(M= 3.267 SE= .128; B= -1.190, β= -.248, SE= .512, p<.05).  However, female 
participants in the accountability condition (M= 3.425 SE= .132) did not differ from 
female participants in the control condition (M= 3.267 SE= .128, B= -.696, β= -.150, SE= 
.461, p>.05, see Table 20 and 21).  Further, female participants in the distraction 
condition (M= 3.571 SE= .128) did not differ significantly from female participants in the 
accountability condition on tolerance (M= 3.425 SE= .132; B= .493, β= .106, SE= .507, 
p= .332).  Conversely, male participants were less tolerant in the distraction condition 
(M= 3.525 SE= .197) than in the control condition (M= 3.816 SE= .224, B= -1.190, β= -
.393, SE= .512, p<.05.  Male participants in the accountability condition (M= 3.626 SE= 
.223) were significantly less tolerant than male participants in the control condition (M= 
3.816 SE= .224, B= -.696, β= -.237, SE= .461, p<.05). Male participants in the distraction 
condition (M= 3.525 SE= .197) did not significantly differ from male participants in the 
accountability condition on political tolerance (M= 3.626 SE= .223; B= -.493, β= -.163, 
SE= .507, p>.05).  
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Three-Way Interaction Models (Moderator by Moderator by Condition) 
 Main effect and two-way interaction analyses were followed by testing for 
possible three-way interactions between condition and two continuous moderator 
variables (effort, interest, attention, and need for cognition). To test possible interactions 
between condition and these variables, linear regression with interaction terms was again 
employed. Analyses were again run with and without controls. When employed, control 
variables (effort, interest, attention, need for cognition, and gender) were entered into the 
regression equation along with condition and the potential moderators variable at step 1. 
The condition by moderator variable (effort, interest, attention, or need for cognition) 
interaction terms, as well as the two-way interaction terms for the two moderator 
variables were entered as additional predictors at step 2.  The three-way interaction terms 
between condition and the two moderator variables were entered at step 3.  As before, 
“main effects” of condition and the moderator were tested at step 1, while condition by 
moderator effects were tested at step 2, and condition by moderator three-ways were 
tested at step 3.  
Condition by Attention and Expertise Three-way Interaction 
 Only one three-way regression analysis yielded significant results: a two-way 
interaction of the accountability dummy-code and political expertise predicting tolerance, 
within the regression equation for a three-way interaction of condition, attention and 
political expertise. Condition, attention, and expertise were entered at step 1; two-way 
interaction terms (condition dummy codes by attention, by expertise, and expertise by 
attention) were entered at step 2. At step 3, the two three-way interaction terms were 
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added (accountability dummy code by attention by expertise, and distraction dummy 
code by attention by expertise). 
 Step 1 revealed no significant effect of condition predicting tolerance for the 
accountability (B= -.132, β= -.053, SE= .217 with controls; B= -.156, β= -.062, SE= .213 
without controls) and distraction conditions (B= -.313, β= -.117, SE= .229 with controls; 
B= -.331, β= -.124, SE= .224 without controls, all p>.05, see Tables 22 and 23). Step 1 
results did reveal a significant main effect of attention on tolerance without controls (B=-
1.003, β= -.306, SE= .266, t(159)= -3.770, p<.001), but not with controls (B= -.297, β= -
.091, SE= .402). The effect of attention in the regression without controls indicates that 
higher self-report of attention to politics predicted lower levels of political tolerance.   
Analyses at step 2 revealed a significant two-way interaction between the 
accountability dummy code and political expertise predicting tolerance, without controls 
(B= 2.684, β= .209, SE= .1.177, t(154)= 2.280, p= .024 , see Tables 22 and 23), but was 
only marginally significant in the regression run with controls (B= 2.03, β= .158, SE= 
1.19 p<.10). No other two-way interactions were significant in this model, nor were any 
three-way interactions of condition, attention, and expertise at step 3.  
 Simple slopes analyses revealed that participants high in political expertise were 
less tolerant in the accountability condition (M= 3.148 SE= .373) than in the control 
condition (M= 3.741 SE= .368; B= 2.624, β= .565, SE= 1.179, p<.05). Participants high 
in political expertise in the distraction condition (M= 3.906, SE= .311) did not differ 
significantly from participants high in political expertise in the control condition on 
political tolerance (M= 3.741, SE= .368; B= .024, β= .005, SE= 1.446, p= .978),  
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Participants high in expertise in the distraction condition were marginally more 
tolerant than participants high in expertise in the accountability condition (B= -2.600, β= 
-.525, SE= 1.376, p= .061).   
Conversely, participants low in political expertise were more tolerant in the 
accountability condition (M= 3.810 SE= .385) than in the control condition (M= 3.092 
SE= .355; B= 2.624, β= .553, SE= 1.179, p<.05). Participants in the control condition 
(M= 3.092 SE= .355) did not differ from low political expertise participants in the 
distraction condition (M= 3.269 SE= .317; B= -.024, β= -.005, SE= 1.446, see Table 24). 
Participants low in expertise in the accountability condition (M= 3.810 SE= .385) were 
marginally more tolerant than low expertise participants in the distraction condition (M= 
3.269 SE= .317; B= -2.600, β= -.528, SE= 1.376, p= .061). These results again support 
the hypothesis that the accountability manipulation inspires “flexible deliberation” that 
has starkly different results in political experts and non-experts.  
As predicted by hypothesis 5, accountability seems to inspire political experts to 
deliberate in a manner that decreases tolerance (perhaps by inspiring them to consider 
safety concerns, or other negative consequences of free speech, or alternatively by 
inspiring them to consider which response is more socially desirable or politically 
appropriate), while it inspires non-experts to deliberate in a manner that increases 
tolerance (perhaps by inspiring them to consider pro-free-speech, pro-democratic norms 
they do not normally ponder, or by leading them to report higher tolerance in an attempt 
at providing a social desirable response). These findings support hypothesis five, and 
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complement the above findings, where a similar pattern was observed for participants 
high and low in need for cognition.  
 At step 3, no significant three-way interactions were found between attention, 
expertise, and the accountability (B= -1.991, β= -.064, SE= 2.978) and distraction (B=-
4.672, β= -.151, SE= 3.383) dummy codes predicting political tolerance (both p>.05). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
Replication of Past Findings on Tolerance 
 Preliminary analyses replicated many core findings that have dominated the 
political tolerance literature of the last few decades. Since the advent of a content-
controlled political tolerance measures that separate tolerance judgments from the 
selection of “least liked” groups, political tolerances has been demonstrated to be 
essentially independent of ideological or partisan political leanings (Sullivan et al, 1981; 
Sullivan et al, 1993).  The results of this study reflect this prevailing finding, as political 
ideology and political party identification were not significantly associated with 
participants‟ political tolerance, nor were they related to the continuous predictor 
variables that were associated with tolerance levels, such as need for cognition, attention 
to politics, interest in politics, and political expertise. 
 The results of this experiment also support Stouffer‟s (1955) longstanding finding 
that elite participants are more tolerant. While no participants in this sample were true 
political elites, in that none wield notable political power, the most “elitelike” participants 
were the most tolerant, as evidenced by the high positive correlations between political 
variables such as interest and expertise, with tolerance . As numerous studies subsequent
to Stouffer have illustrated, greater political knowledge and interest spell higher levels of 
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al, 1995). Furthermore, general cognitive differences that have previously been 
demonstrated to relate to political tolerance also emerged  as relevant predictors as well:  
need for cognition was strongly positively related to political tolerance, which recalls past 
research stating that higher education and intelligence levels is associated with higher 
levels of tolerance (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sinderman, 1984).  
 The preliminary results of this study also support Sullivan et al‟s (1982) “least-
liked‟ methodology for measuring political tolerance. The tolerance questionnaire items 
used in this study were closely based on the stems devised by Sullivan and colleagues, 
and the “least-liked” procedure of personalizing items using the political group most 
abhorrent to the individual participant was drawn directly from their body of research.  
The twenty items based on Sullivan et al‟s past research displayed massive item-total 
reliability and were related to measured political constructs in a theoretically coherent 
way that conformed both to past research and to the present hypotheses. These results 
provide further support for the reliability and validity of the least-liked tolerance 
measure.  
Support for Hypotheses: Flexible Deliberation 
 The results of the present study support hypothesis five, which predicted that the 
accountability manipulation would inspire “flexible deliberation” of the sort that would 
push normally tolerant respondents into less tolerant views, and would move 
participants inclined to intolerance into higher-than-typical levels tolerance. Specifically, 
results of two-way and three-way analyses indicated that the effect of the accountability 
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manipulation on tolerance was moderated by either need for cognition or political 
expertise. The pattern of results that emerged for both moderators was a crossover 
interaction; while greater expertise or higher need for cognition was associated with 
higher tolerance (based on the high positive correlation of both with tolerance), higher 
scores on these variables predicted lower tolerance among participants in the 
accountability condition. 
 This pattern of results provides cursory evidence for the notion that tolerance is a 
relatively “knee-jerk”, nearly automatic attitudinal response for most participants, and 
this appears to be true of participants who report both high and low tolerance. Note that it 
was the effect of the accountability manipulation that was moderated by participants‟ 
need for cognition or political expertise in these analyses, suggesting that the distraction 
and control conditions had an essentially similar influence on participants of high and 
low need for cognition and political expertise.  
If high political tolerance were, for example, the result of a slow, cognitively 
effortful “sober second thought” as predicted by Stouffer (1955), the present study‟s 
results should show that the effect of the distraction manipulation is moderated by need 
for cognition or expertise, such that “elitelike” participants high in either of these 
variables would be unable to take a sober second thought when distracted, and would 
report lower than usual tolerance. Rather, the opposite pattern was found: “elitelike” 
participants, those high in need for cognition or political knowledge, apparently became 
less tolerant when they were held accountable for their responses and encouraged to think 
more.  
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The results support hypotheses five then, by a) demonstrating that the 
distraction and control conditions are more similar in their effect on tolerance than is the 
accountability condition; and by b) demonstrating that the accountability manipulation 
pushes participants high in political expertise and need for cognition away from their 
typically high levels of tolerance while pushing participants low on these constructs away 
from their typically low tolerance. Thus, the accountability manipulation appears to 
inspire enhanced “deliberation” on the tolerance items, but not deliberation of a uniform 
sort. Participants high and low on need for cognition and political expertise apparently 
are altering their tolerance responses in the accountability condition, and they are doing 
so in different ways, indicating that the “deliberation” inspired by the accountability 
instructions is flexible and malleable. There are several potential underlying mechanisms 
that can account for this pattern: social desirability, overcorrection, and flexible 
deliberation.  
Social Desirability 
 Participants high in political expertise or need for cognition might have reported 
lower tolerance in the accountability while participants low in these variables reported 
greater tolerance because both groups were motivated by the instructions to provide 
socially desirable responses. In the accountability condition, participants were informed 
that they would have to share and explain their responses to the tolerance items with 
another research participant of unknown views. These instructions might have motivated 
participants not to ponder the tolerance questions more thoughtfully on their own merit, 
but rather may have inspired them to try to provide a “normal”, appropriate response.  
   
 
39 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Participants high and low in expertise and NFC may harbor different 
impressions, then, of what the typical and socially desirable response to tolerance items 
might be, causing them to report diametrically opposing “socially desirable” answers. 
“Elitelike” participants, those who know a great deal about politics or who are attracted 
to thinking a great deal, might  have realized that the average participant is not 
particularly tolerant, and may have decided to scale down their level of tolerance 
downward in order to appeal to the more typical person. Conversely, a less “elitelike” 
participant who knows little about politics or who doesn‟t like to think effortfully might 
decide to give more tolerant responses than they normally would give, in order to appeal 
to a hypothetical participant who is inclined toward greater tolerance. Thus, the 
accountability manipulation might cause participants of differing levels of knowledge and 
NFC to adjust their reported tolerance in opposing directions, both out of a desire to give 
a response their conversation partner might be apt to like.  
Overcorrection 
 Similarly, the accountability manipulation might inspire participants to expend 
effort trying to report the “correct” response to the tolerance items. If this is the case, 
participants might attempt to adjust for their own preexisting biases- either in favor of or 
in opposition to tolerance- but might mistakenly overcorrect, resulting in lower-than-
usual tolerance for “elites” and higher-than-usual tolerance for nonelites. This potential 
mechanism is distinct from an aforementioned social desirability effect in that it posits 
participants were motivated by a desire to give a factually „correct‟ response rather than 
pander to the particular opinion of their future conversation partner.  
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Flexible Deliberation 
 Finally, the pattern of results observed may arise because the accountability 
manipulation encourages participants to consider factors they normally do not consider 
when forming their tolerance judgments. For example, “elitelike” participants may be 
predisposed to tolerance in the distraction and control conditions because they think of 
the tolerance items in terms of civil liberties rights and focus on the importance of 
upholding democratic values, while nonelite or less tolerant participants are more apt to 
consider issues of public safety, the importance of censorship, and the need to protect 
young people from dangerous views when they initially view the tolerance questionnaire 
items. The accountability manipulation may serve as a cue for participants to consider 
factors they do not consider normally- either due to increased effort, increased integrative 
complexity, or motivation to take into account factors that their conversation partner 
might find important. 
 As described in hypothesis five, “elitelike” participants in the accountability 
condition may decide to take into account decisional factors that they normally do not 
weigh when reading the tolerance items; they may incorporate safety concerns or think 
about the other negative consequences of free speech for abhorrent groups, causing their 
tolerance judgments to adjust downward from their more typical levels. Conversely, 
participants low in expertise or need for cognition may also interpret the accountability 
instructions as a cue to consider factors they normally ignore, and therefore may consider 
the importance of upholding democratic values, or the intrinsic value of free speech, and 
report higher-than-usual tolerance as a result.  
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 While need for cognition and political expertise appeared to moderate the 
effect of the accountability condition in a manner consistent with hypothesis five, the 
present data cannot provide definitive insights into why this pattern emerged or what 
psychological process underlied it. If, for example, the accountability instructions 
increased the extent to which participants elaborated and deliberated effortfully on the 
tolerance items, an effect of condition on participants‟‟ self-report of effort should have 
emerged. Since condition appeared to bear no influence on participants‟ effort in 
answering the tolerance questionnaire, it is impossible to rule out any of the three 
psychological mechanisms described above. The effect of the accountability 
manipulation on participants‟ political tolerance may have emerged because of 
participants‟ desire to give a socially desirable response, to provide a „correct‟ response, 
or to think more effortfully and take into account factors they did not otherwise typically 
consider.  
 Future replications of this experiment should include multiple manipulation 
checks, including a detailed and open-ended measure of integrative complexity (see 
Tetlock, 1983). Future versions of this study should feature an a essay-format question 
asking participants to describe the factors they considered when crafting their responses 
to the tolerance items. This detailed response could then be coded for degree 
differentiation and integration of various arguments, and could be used to determine 
whether participants in the accountability condition actually thought more (or more 
effortfully) than participants in the other conditions. If there is no effect of accountability 
on participants‟ cognitive effort (as may be the case in the present results), this would 
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support the possibility that the moderation of condition by need for cognition or 
expertise results from a social desirability effects or overcorrection. Social desirability 
could be tested as an underlying mechanism in future studies by explicitly stating (and 
manipulating) the reported tolerance of the participant‟s conversation partner (see below 
for a more detailed description of future directions).  
Distraction by Gender Interaction 
 An unhypothesized effect emerged in two-way analyses: the effect of the 
distraction condition on political tolerance appears to be moderated by participants‟ 
gender. Namely, women reported higher tolerance in the distraction condition than the 
control and accountability conditions, while men reported lower tolerance in the 
distraction condition than in the other two conditions. It is unclear why this pattern 
emerged. Historical research on political tolerance has suggested that women are slightly 
less tolerant than men (Stouffer, 1955), but the present study posits no a priori reason to 
expect that women would respond differently to the distraction manipulation than men.  
 One potential explanation for the observed moderation effect is that men and 
women were not „distracted‟ equally by the distraction task. Due to either differences in 
ability or due to stereotype threat, women may have found the number-memorization task 
more daunting than men (see Spencer, Steel & Quinn, 1999). Threatened by the pervasive 
stereotype that women are worse with numbers than men, female participants may have 
expended more effort memorizing the number string and may have been more distracted 
from the tolerance questions, which may have caused them to consider the negative 
drawbacks of tolerance less and report a more tolerant view. Men might have been less 
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distracted and cognitively taxed by the number memorization task and may have 
had more available cognitive resources, allowing them to consider the potential 
consequences of tolerance, leading to diminished tolerance. The opposite, of course, 
could also be true- women might have slightly better memory performance at this task 
than men and might have reported greater tolerance because they had an opportunity to 
deliberate on the benefits of free speech, while men were more vexed by the task and less 
able to adjust for their prejudices against their least-liked group as a result, leading to 
diminished tolerance. 
 Alternatively, the interaction between gender and the distraction condition may 
have emerged because the psychological underpinnings of tolerance are different for 
male and female participants. Perhaps for women tolerance is a more immediate “knee-
jerk” response that only gets dampened when there is an opportunity to consider negative 
consequences, whereas men become more tolerant when they have more time to process 
effortfully. If this is the case, the number-memorization task may have distracted male 
and female respondents equally, but with opposing results: distracted women may not 
have the chance to ponder the dangers of tolerance, and become more tolerant, whereas 
distracted men may be denied the opportunity to adjust for their prejudices for their least-
liked political group, and become less tolerant. This explanation of the results, however, 
does hinge on the possibility that men and women are hardwired to think about civil 
liberties in different ways from the start, which is an explanation that itself demands an 
underlying mechanism and is therefore rather unparsimonious. Future studies should use 
an alternative distraction manipulation to see if the gender moderation effect remains (if 
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men and women are not equally distracted by the number-memorization effect, a 
more equitable distraction task should erase this moderation effect; see the future 
directions section below).  
Study Limitations 
Weak Manipulation of Accountability and Distraction  
 The present study features several limitations which should be corrected in future 
replications. The largest issue with the study is the apparent weakness of the 
accountability and distraction conditions on participants‟ responses. Recall that no main 
effect of condition on political tolerance emerged, nor did condition appear to have an 
effect of participants‟ effort in responding to questions. The accountability and distraction 
conditions may not have been successful for several reasons: the manipulations may have 
been too “weak”, participants may not have taken the manipulations seriously, or 
participants may not have paid attention to the manipulations.  
 First, the accountability and distraction manipulations may not have been 
“strong” enough to garner their intended effects. While accountability to another 
hypothetical participant has been demonstrated to increase integrative complexity in 
previous research (e.g. Tetlock, 1984), it may not have influenced participants strongly 
enough in this experiment to lead to statistically significant effects on tolerance and self-
reported effort. The same may be true of the distraction manipulation: participants may 
have been somewhat distracted by the number-memorizing task, but not a great deal, 
causing the manipulation to have no apparent significant effect on tolerance or effort. If 
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the accountability and distraction manipulations were successful but subtle, a larger 
sample size or stronger manipulation instructions could lead to observable effects.  
However, the accountability and distraction manipulations may instead have been 
unsuccessful because participants did not believe or comply with the conditions‟ 
instructions. Participants in the accountability condition may not have believed that they 
would actually be paired with a conversation partner who would know their tolerance 
responses; this may be especially true of participants in single-person experimental 
sessions. Participants in the distraction condition may have decided not to expend much 
effort memorizing the number string, or may have willfully ignored the distraction 
conditions altogether. The use of a confederate “conversation partner” could resolve the 
former problem, whereas more strongly-worded instructions from the experimenter could 
resolve the latter. 
Finally, the accountability and distraction manipulations may have failed because 
participants did not notice them. The study‟s respondents were drawn from a convenience 
sample of undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course,  and all 
participants were expected to participate in several different experiments in order to 
fulfill a course requirement. These participants may not have devoted a great deal of 
attention to the experimenter‟s instructions, or may have been motivated to complete the 
whole experiment as quickly as possible, which may have caused  some respondents to 
miss or accidentally ignore the accountability or distraction instructions entirely. Again, a 
more strongly-worded set of condition instructions and a more emphatic experimenter 
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could potential resolve this issue and lead to a statistically significant effect on 
tolerance and effort.  
Insensitive Manipulation Check 
 Another potential drawback of the present study is insensitivity of the 
manipulation check. As outlined above, there was no apparent effect of the accountability 
and distraction manipulations on participants‟ self-report of effort. This may have 
occurred because the manipulations were truly unsuccessful (as they apparently were on 
tolerance), or because the measure of effort was insensitive. As a self-report measure, the 
manipulation check may have fallen prey to social desirability effects. Participants may 
have been uniformly motivated to report that they expended a decent amount of effort 
answering the tolerance questions; this could have led to a “ceiling effect” whereby any 
increase in effort caused by the accountability manipulation was impossible to discover. 
Alternatively, participants may not have much awareness of their true level of effort 
expenditure, and therefore might be unable to report any effect the manipulations had on 
their responses. Future replications of this study should include a more detailed 
manipulation check, such as a measure of integrative complexity; in the future, 
participants‟ response-times should also be recorded, to determine whether the 
accountability or distraction conditions influence how quickly participants respond to the 
tolerance items.  
   
 
47 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
Conclusion 
Future Directions 
Stronger Manipulations 
 Future replications of this study should feature stronger accountability and 
distraction manipulations, to determine whether there truly is a main effect of instruction 
and motivation participants‟ political tolerance. The accountability and distraction 
instructions should be more emphatically-worded and explained at greater length by the 
experimenter, to ensure that all participants hear and consider the instructions unique to 
their condition and abide by them.  The accountability manipulation should also be made 
more believable in future versions of this study, with more strongly-worded instructions 
from the experimenter, and perhaps the inclusion of a confederate “conversation partner” 
to convince participants that they truly will be expected to explain their tolerance 
responses to another person.  
Future replications could also vary whether or not participants in the 
accountability condition are made aware of their conversation partners‟ views, and could 
vary the comparative tolerance or intolerance of the partner, to help determine whether 
apparent effects of accountability on tolerance are driven by social desirability 
motivations. If the effect of accountability on tolerance is driven by participants‟‟ 
motivation to provide a socially desirable response, they should alter their tolerance 
responses to mimic those of their conversation partner; however, if accountability instead 
influence the extent to which participants elaborate on the tolerance items (or the nature 
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of the information they consider), the explicit views of the conversation partner 
should have no effect.  
The distraction manipulation should also be strengthened, both by bolstering the 
length and detail of the experimenter‟s instructions, and by making the distraction task 
more cognitively taxing.  Again, more emphatically-worded instructions will help the 
researchers ensure that all participants in the distraction condition take part in the 
distraction task, which should increase the likelihood of discovering any main effects of 
distraction on tolerance where the exist. Furthermore, the number string should be 
lengthened or the distraction task should be replaced with an alternate, more challenging 
task; this will ensure that all participants in the distraction are truly “distracted” and 
unable to elaborate or think effortfully about the tolerance items. The distraction task 
should also perhaps be replaced with a lexical-decision-making task, or another tasking 
that will not potentially induce stereotype threat in female respondents. Replacing the 
distraction task with a less numerical activity would allow the researcher to determine the 
nature and origins of the distraction-by-gender interaction discovered in the present 
study.  
Improved Manipulation Checks 
 Future variations on the present study should also feature more sensitive and 
detailed manipulation checks. As described above, there was no apparent effect of the 
accountability and distraction conditions on participants‟ perceived effort. This may have 
occurred because of a weakness in the experimental manipulation, or because the effort 
measures were insensitive to real variation in participants‟ effort levels. Future 
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manipulation checks should rely less on participant self-report. Participants‟ 
reaction-times should be recorded for the tolerance items, to determine whether or not 
participants in the accountability or distraction conditions answered the tolerance 
questions at different speeds from participants in the control condition. If the 
experimental manipulations do have an influence on participants‟ motivation or the 
extent to which they ponder the tolerance items, a quantifiable difference in their 
answering speeds should appear.  
 The present study could also be enhanced if participants‟ integrative complexity 
were assessed. Following the tolerance questionnaire, participants should be asked to 
write at length about what issues they considered while answering the previous questions. 
These detailed responses could then be coded for their levels of differentiation and 
integration of ideas, which could then be used to calculate participants‟ level of 
integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1983). This manipulation check would allow the 
experimenter to determine whether the accountability condition truly does motivate 
participants to think more effortfully about the tolerance items, and whether this inspires 
participants to ponder factors that do not normally enter into their tolerance judgments 
otherwise. If the experimental manipulations had no influence on participants‟ integrative 
complexity, the experimenter could rule out flexible deliberation as the underlying 
mechanism accounting for differences in tolerance across condition. Conversely, if 
condition-based effects on participants‟ integrative complexity were discovered, there 
would be initial support for the notion that the accountability and distraction 
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manipulations influence the nature of participants‟ “sober second thoughts”, which 
in turn influences their tolerance.  
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Table 1. Results of univariate ANOVA for condition predicting effort without controls.  
Effects Sums of 
squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F value P value 
Condition 4.329 2 2.164 1.341 .264 
Error 261.474 162 1.614 - - 
Total 265.803 165 - - - 
 
Table 2. Results of univariate ANOVA for condition predicting effort with controls.  
Effects Sums of 
squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F value P value 
Condition .100 1 .100 .072 .789 
Error 218.465 156 1.400 - - 
Total 262.100 164 - - - 
 
Table 3. Results of pairwise contrasts of conditions predicting effort, without controls.  
Contrast Difference Standard Error P value 
Distraction versus 
Control 
.289 .250 .248 
Accountability 
versus Distraction 
.390 .244 .111 
Accountability 
versus Control 
.101 .236 .669 
 
Table 4. Results of pairwise contrasts of conditions predicting effort, with controls.  
Contrast Difference Standard Error P value 
Distraction versus 
Control 
-.328 .236 .166 
Accountability 
versus Distraction 
.381 .231 .100 
Accountability 
versus Control 
.053 .224 .812 
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Table 5. Results of contrast of participants in accountability to participants in the 
distraction and control conditions (pooled) on effort.  
Contrast F value η² P value 
Accountability 
versus Distraction 
and Control, without 
controls 
1.149 .007 .285 
Accountability 
versus Distraction 
and Control with 
controls 
1.338 .008 .249 
 
 
Table 6. ANOVA for the effect of condition on predictor variables, without controls.  
Effects Sums of 
squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F value P value 
Condition 
on Expertise 
.121 2 .061 1.658 .194 
Error  5.894 161 .037 - - 
Total 6.015 164 - - - 
Condition 
on Attention 
.242 2 .121 .862 .424 
Error 22.752 162 - - - 
Total 22.994 165    
Condition 
on Interest 
1.321 2 .661 1.386 .253 
Error 77.199 162 .477 - - 
Total 78.520 165 - - - 
Condition 
on Need for 
Cognition 
.000 1 .000 .001 .974 
Error 22.205 162 .137 - - 
Total 22.320 165 - - - 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level.  
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Table 7. ANOVA for the effect of condition on predictor variables, with controls.  
Effects Sums of 
squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F value P value 
Condition 
on Expertise 
.026 1 .026 .887 .348 
Error  4.585 157 .029 - - 
Total 6.015 164 - - - 
Condition 
on Attention 
.004 1 .004 .072 .788 
Error 7.797 157 .050 - - 
Total 22.750 164 - - - 
Condition 
on Interest 
.018 1 .018 .114 .736 
Error 24.324 157 .155 - - 
Total 78.359 164 - - - 
Condition 
on Need for 
Cognition 
.016 1 .016 .145 .704 
Error 17.003 157 .108 - - 
Total 22.303 164 - - - 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level.
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Table 8. Correlation matrix for all continuous variables analyzed.  
 Tolerance Effort Expertise Interest Attention Need for 
Cognition 
Gender Ideology Party 
Tolerance 1.00         
Effort .147 1.00        
Expertise .212** .063 1.00       
Interest .367** .171 .441** 1.00      
Attention -.344** -.167* -.410** -.805** 1.00     
Need for 
Cognition 
-.340** -.374** -.124 -.462** .411 1.00    
Gender -.166* -.128 -.246** -.252** .243 .162* 1.00   
Ideology .044 -.002 .105 .043 -.080 .042 -.093 1.00  
Party .113 -.031 .013 -.010 -.089 .018 -.097 .780** 1.00 
 + marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level..
5
4
 
5
4
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Table 9. Condition predicting tolerance analysis of variance. 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F η² p 
Condition 2.235 2 1.117 .742 .009p .478 
Error 243.969 162 1.506    
 
Table 10. Condition predicting tolerance analysis of covariance. 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F η² p 
Condition 2.753 2 1.377 1.092 .014 .338 
Gender .556 1 .556 .441 .003 .508 
Need for 
Cognition 
9.434 1 9.434 7.486 .046 .007 
Expertise .760 1 .760 .603 .004 .439 
Interest 1.605 1 1.605 1.274 .008 .261 
Attention .686 1 .686 .544 .003 .462 
Error 196.612 156 1.260    
 
 
Table 11. Results of pairwise contrasts of conditions predicting political tolerance, 
without controls.  
Contrast Difference Standard Error P value 
Distraction versus 
Control 
-.268 .241 .268 
Accountability 
versus Distraction 
.043 .235 .855 
Accountability 
versus Control 
-.225 .228 .326 
 
 
Table 12. Results of pairwise contrasts of conditions predicting political tolerance, 
without controls.  
Contrast Difference Standard Error P value 
Distraction versus 
Control 
.325 .226 .152 
Accountability 
versus Distraction 
.168 .221 .448 
Accountability 
versus Control 
-.157 .213 .463 
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Table 13. Mean political tolerance scores for participants in the accountability, 
distraction, and control conditions.  
 Accountability Distraction Control Omnibus F 
Value 
P value 
With 
controls 
3.470 3.301 3.627 1.092 .338 
No controls 3.420 3.378 3.645 .742 .478 
 
 
Table 14. Condition and need for cognition predicting political tolerance.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 3.416** .119 - 3.425** .120 - 
Accountability 
(A) 
-.156 .213 -.062 -.167 .212 -.066 
Distraction 
(D) 
-.331 .224 -.124 -.345 .224 -.129 
Need for 
Cognition (N) 
-.745** .272 -.225 -.506 .327 -.153 
Attention -.297 .402 -.091 -.386 .405 -.118 
Interest .257 .228 .146 .199 .230 .113 
Expertise .407 .524 .064 .517 .527 .081 
Gender -.137 .206 -.050 -.167 .207 -.061 
AxN - - - .972+ .582 .147 
DxN - - - .454 .596 .069 
R² .130 .139 
F Change in 
R² 
7.984** .841 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
Table 15. Condition and need for cognition predicting political tolerance without 
controls.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 3.378** .111 - 3.378** .111 - 
Accountability 
(A) 
-.271 .215 -.107 -.281 .215 -.111 
Distraction 
(D) 
-.344 .227 -.129 -.358 .228 -.134 
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Need for 
Cognition (N) 
-1.156** .245 -.348 -.981** .306 -.295 
AxN - - - .754 .585 .114 
DxN - - - .299 .609 .045 
R² .130 .139 
F Change in 
R² 
7.984 .841 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
Table 16. Estimated mean tolerance scores for participants high and low in need for 
cognition in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions, with controls.  
 Accountability Control Distraction 
High Need for 
Cognition 
3.013 (SE .202)* 3.172 (SE .212)* 3.231 (SE .191) 
Low Need for 
Cognition 
4.004 (SE .204)** 3.678 (SE .192)** 3.964 (SE .193) 
* and ** indicate marginally significant mean differences.  
 
Table 17. Estimated mean tolerance scores for participants high and low in need for 
cognition in the accountability, control, and distraction conditions, without controls.  
 Accountability Control Distraction 
High Need for 
Cognition 
2.839 (SE.191) 2.887 (SE.194) 2.991(SE.178) 
Low Need for 
Cognition 
4.197(SE.190) 3.868 (SE.184) 4.122 (SE.185) 
 * and ** indicate marginally significant mean differences.  
 
Table 18. Condition and gender predicting political tolerance, with controls.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 3.416** .119 - 3.508** .126 - 
Accountability 
(A) 
-.156 .213 -.062 -.040 .230 -.016 
Distraction 
(D) 
-.331 .224 -.124 -.079 .253 -.030 
Gender (G) -.137 .206 -.050 -.474+ .258 -.175 
Attention -.297 .402 -.091 -.260 .399 -.079 
Interest .257 .228 .146 .258 .226 .146 
Expertise .407 .524 .064 .547 .524 .086 
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Need for 
Cognition 
-.745** .272 -.225 -.690* .271 -.209 
AxG - - - -.592 .455 -.121 
DxG - - - -1.080* .505 -.220 
R² .193 .217 
F Change in 
R² 
5.323 2.343 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level 
 
Table 19. Condition and gender predicting political tolerance, without controls.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 3.507** .128 - 3.608** .134 - 
Accountability 
(A) 
-.204 .226 -.081 -.059 .244 -.023 
Distraction 
(D) 
-.223 .240 -.084 .042 .269 .016 
Gender (G) -.434* .212 -.159 -.820** .268 .016 
AxG - - - -.787 .487 -.160 
DxG - - - -1.186* .538 -.214 
R² .034 .066 
F Change in 
R² 
1.903 2.667 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level 
 
Table 20. Estimated means for female and male participants in the accountability, 
control, and distraction conditions, with controls.  
 Accountability Control Distraction 
Female 3.425 (SE .132)* 3.267 (SE .128)* 3.571 (SE .128) 
Male 3.626 (SE .223)** 3.816 (SE .224)** 3.525 (SE .197) 
* and ** indicate marginally significant mean differences 
 
Table 21. Estimated means for female and male participants in the accountability, 
control, and distraction conditions, without controls.  
 Accountability Control Distraction 
Female 3.424 (SE .139)* 3.198 (SE .133)* 3.474 (SE .134) 
Male 3.851 (SE .230)** 4.018 (SE.233)** 3.700 (SE .203)  
 * and ** indicate marginally significant mean differences 
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Table 22. Condition, attention, and expertise predicting political tolerance, without 
controls.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 3.394** .112 - 3.376** .115 - 
Accountability 
(A) 
-.132 .217 -.053 -.095 .217 -.038 
Distraction (D) -.313 .229 -.117 -.329 .228 -.123 
Attention (AT) -.100** .266 -.306 -.977** .331 -.299 
Expertise (E) .516 .520 .081 .574 .689 .090 
AxE - - - 2.684* 1.117 .209 
DxE - - - -.040 1.44 -.003 
AxAT - - - .392 .637 .060 
DxAT - - - .281 .702 .043 
ExAT - - - -1.673 1.263 -.101 
R² .361 .419 
F Change in R² 5.950 1.686 
Variable Model 3 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.339** .119 - 
Accountability 
(A) 
-.170 .234 -.067 
Distraction (D) -.481+ .253 -.180 
Attention (AT) -.978** .332 -.299 
Expertise (E) .467 .694 .073 
AxE 2.593* 1.181 .202 
DxE -.345 1.461 -.027 
AxAT .534 .646 .081 
DxAT .418 .714 .064 
ExAT -2.933 1.570 -.178 
AxATxE -1.991 2.978 -.064 
DxATxE -4.672 3.838 -.151 
R² .186 
F Change in R² .955 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 23. Condition, attention, and expertise predicting political tolerance, with 
controls.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 3.416** .119 - 3.384** .128 - 
Accountability 
(A) 
-.156 .213 -.062 -.126 .215 -.050 
Distraction (D) -.331 .224 -.124 -.342 .225 -.128 
Attention (AT) -.297 .402 -.091 -.393 .439 -.120 
Expertise (E) .407 .524 .064 .427 .688 .067 
Need for 
Cognition 
-.745** .272 -.225 -.703 .276* -.213 
Interest .257 .228 .146 .177 .232 .101 
Gender -.137 .206 -.050 -.093 .214 -.034 
AxE - - - 2.03+ 1.19 .158 
DxE - - - -.209 1.437 -.013 
AxAT - - - .372 .642 .057 
DxAT - - - .273 .703 .042 
ExAT - - - -1.574 1.272 -.095 
R² .193 .222 
F Change in R² 5.323 1.149 
Variable Model 3 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.353** .130 - 
Accountability 
(A) 
-.189 .230 -.075 
Distraction (D) -.486+ .249 -.182 
Attention (AT) -.347 .440 -.106 
Expertise (E) .294 .696 .046 
Need for 
Cognition 
-.661* .279 -.200 
Interest .224 .237 .127 
Gender -.107 .215 -.039 
AxE 1.939 1.139 .151 
DxE -.503 1.453 -.040 
AxAT .494 .649 .075 
DxAT .387 .711 .059 
ExAT -2.774+ 1.569 -.168 
AxATxE -1.801 2.980 -.058 
DxATxE -4.577 3.373 -.148 
R² .232 
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F Change in R² .930 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
 ** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
Table 24. Estimated means for participants high and low in political expertise in the 
accountability, control, and distraction conditions, without controls.  
 Accountability Control Distraction 
High Political 
Expertise 
3.148 (SE .373)*+ 3.741 (SE .368)* 3.906 (SE .311)+ 
Low Political 
Expertise 
3.810 (SE .385)**++ 3.092 (SE .355)** 3.269 (SE .317)++ 
+, ++, *, and ** indicate  significant  mean differences 
 
Table 25. Estimated means for participants high and low in political expertise in the 
accountability, control, and distraction conditions, with controls.  
 Accountability Control Distraction 
High Political 
Expertise 
3.257 (SE .370) 3.683 (SE.369) 3.879 (SE .310) 
Low Political 
Expertise 
3.771 (SE.390)  3.192 (SE.360) 3.343 (SE .330) 
+, ++, *, and ** indicate significant mean differences 
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